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Beelines, Bypasses and Blind Alleys:  
Theory and the Study of the European Union1 
 
TIM HAUGHTON 
University of Birmingham  
 
Introduction 
Whilst the European Union has been beset by economic, political and existential 
crises in recent years, if our yardstick is the number of articles and books 
produced, the same cannot be said for the academic study of the EU. Indeed, the 
scholarly industry of analysing and seeking to explain what Jacques Delors once 
dubbed the ‘Unidentified Political Object’ is in rude health.2 If crisis is good copy 
for journalists, crisis and complexity are often helpful ingredients for scholarly 
enquiry and provoke interest from publishers and journals.   
 
A sizeable slice of recent literature on the EU has sought to offer new theories, 
new theoretical contributions or contributions to theory building. But to what 
extent have they improved our knowledge and understanding? After reflecting 
on the broader challenges associated with attempts to theorize and theory’s role 
in the study of the EU, this contribution seeks to make four main arguments. 
Firstly, four new theoretical routes are identified: alternative, adaptation, 
synthesis and explaining disintegration. Each of these adds something to our 
understanding of the European Union and, as the great scholar of European 
politics Stanley Hoffmann (1959) argued, help fulfil the purpose of theory: to 
pose better questions.  
 
Secondly, building on some of the insights of the new theories it argues that 
given the complexities of the current crises (Copsey, 2015; Phinnemore, 2015) 
and the broader processes of European integration, differentiated integration 
and disintegration, the study of the EU would benefit from the adoption of more 
combinatorial approaches and greater use of interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary approaches. 
 
Thirdly, I argue there is a tendency to presentism, to focus on the current crises, 
but the real merit of close analysis of developments is usually in placing 
developments in the broader historical context of integration. Painting on a 
wider historical canvas offers an opportunity to observe the short and long-term 
dynamics of integration.  
 
                                                        
1 Countless colleagues have offered constructive criticism. I am particularly 
grateful to Anthony Arnull, Lorenzo Cladi, Nathaniel Copsey, Josefin Graef, 
Dermot Hodson, George Kyris, Julian Pänke, Willie Paterson, Nicole Scicluna and 
Mark Webber for comments on various iterations of this contribution.   
2  Speech by Jacques Delors, Luxembourg, 9 September 1985. Available at 
http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/19/423d6913-b4e2-4395-
9157-fe70b3ca8521/publishable_en.pdf. Last accessed 23 April 2016.   
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Fourthly, it calls for a historical and empirical turn.  Whilst recognizing that there 
is to some extent an implicit theoretical choice in any empirical study 
(Rosamond, 2006), it suggests that there is a danger of what Hoffmann (1977, p. 
57) dubbed ‘the rage for premature theorizing’. Before we can explain why 
something happened (or not) we need to know what happened. We need a firm 
foundation of facts and more empirical studies to help avoid the risk of a 
‘tendency towards compulsive and mindless theorizing’ [emphasis in the original] 
(Hirschman, 1970, p. 229). As scholars of the EU our interests do not lie in 
calculating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, but rather how the 
EU works (or does not) and when, why, how and in what form integration (or 
disintegration) occurs. At the heart of these questions are empirical puzzles 
requiring empirical study.  
 
The purpose of this contribution is not to “critique” any one theoretical 
framework, question its ontological and epistemological assumptions and 
suggest that a particular framework is inherently “right” or superior than the 
rest. Rather, my purpose is to assess the contribution these new approaches can 
make to bringing us closer to understanding what Puchala (1971) famously 
depicted as the ‘elephant’, highlight what needs to be done and to ask what role 
theory plays and what role it should play in the study of the European Union.  
 
I. Theory and Scholarship   
There are two major challenges made against theory. Firstly, the search for, and 
refinement of, theory drives scholars away from policy-relevant “useful” work. 
Secondly, theory hinders rather than helps scholarship, or at least it encourages 
scholarship to drive down what turn out to be blind alleys rather than short cuts. 
The worst aspect of this second tendency is akin to the driver who slavishly 
follows his/her GPS convinced it must be right rather than looking around to see 
if the directions make sense. Although I have much sympathy with those who 
bemoan ivory tower ‘scholasticism’ (Mead, 2010), the primary purpose of this 
contribution is not to engage in a debate about the dreaded “impact” agenda 
particularly well-known to those who work in British academia. Rather in light of 
recent scholarship my purpose is more to consider the second question.  
 
Casting her eye over the state of academic life Jane Austen might remark today 
that it is a truth universally acknowledged that a scholar in search of academic 
fame, fortune or just a job is a need of his or her own theory. Thanks to the 
incentive structures of academia, scholars are often quick to theorize or claim 
their work contributes in some (significant) way to theory. Indeed, two of the 
great weaknesses of modern academia are the stronger incentives for individual 
achievement rather than collective knowledge and the vaulted position of theory 
vis-à-vis empirical work.  
 
Theory offers scholars frameworks for understanding, opportunities to find 
meaning in a morass of data and a beeline to an explanation for a set of 
phenomena. In a trenchant defence of the importance of theory Mearsheimer 
and Walt (2013, pp. 431-2) argue theories ‘identify how independent, 
intervening, and dependent variables fit together’ and ‘[m]ost importantly, a 
theory explains why a particular hypothesis should be true, by identifying the 
 4 
causal mechanisms that produce the expected outcome(s)’ [emphasis in the 
original]. ‘Well developed theories’, they assert, are ‘falsifiable and offer non-
trivial explanations [which] ‘yield unambiguous predictions’. They maintain that 
‘[a] single article that advances a new theory or makes sense of a body of 
disparate findings will be more valuable than dozens of empirical studies with 
short shelf-lives’ (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013, p. 448).   
 
Their defence of theory raises numerous questions. I shall return to the value of 
theoretical vis-à-vis empirical studies below, but for now focus on three themes. 
Firstly, all theories are implicitly or explicitly built on ontological and 
epistemological positions. For some, any enquiry a scholar undertakes is imbued 
with these stances which cannot be removed like a sweater, but rather are more 
akin to a scholar’s skin (Furlong and Marsh, 2002). These positions frame 
scholars’ thinking and identify appropriate questions to pose. To buy into a 
particular theory in this thinking, therefore, requires not just an acceptance, but 
an adoption of the same epistemological and ontological positions. Whilst 
respecting the position of the purists, I would suggest the logical extension of 
that argument is a scholarly cacophony in which everyone talks past everyone 
else or else silence in which no-one interacts because there is no agreement on 
the fundamentals. Blending and the type of combinatorial approaches I discuss 
below have distinct dangers, but the payoffs of explanation outweigh the costs of 
a lack of purity. 
 
Secondly, although Wittgenstein bemoaned that ‘we are bewitched into thinking 
that if we lack a scientific theory of something, we lack any understanding of it’ 
(Monk, 1999) almost all scholars (in the social sciences) agree that theory is 
foundational to study. At that point views diverge markedly. For many who 
would classify themselves as constructivists, for instance, ‘theory is a guide to 
empirical exploration, a means of reflecting more or less abstractly upon 
complex processes’ (Hay, 2002, p. 47); a view which sits less comfortably with a 
description of theory as a ‘causal argument of universal, transhistorical validity 
and nomothetic quality, which can be tested through the falsification of a series 
of hypotheses’ (Diez and Wiener, 2009, p. 3). The broader, abstract 
understanding of theory has its merits, but ultimately in both the natural and 
social sciences and in significant slices of the humanities, the key questions are 
causal. Why is it like that? What caused that? Why did it not turn out differently? 
If theory has any role in scholarship it is to advance our understanding of 
causality. Even the more abstract constructivist theorizing is ultimately seeking 
to contribute answers to why questions.  
 
Thirdly, although in the minds of some the discovery of causal mechanisms leads 
onto prediction, the very notion of predictability sits uncomfortably with ‘those 
whose philosophical worldview tells them that the political world is so complex 
and indeterminate that it is not amenable to prediction’ (Hay, 2002, p. 37). Even 
those like Waltz (1990, p. 29), whose Weltanschauung is similar to Mearsheimer 
and Walt, argue that prediction does not have to be part of theory, noting that 
‘theories of evolution predict nothing in particular’. Predictability can be helpful 
and is integral to the attempts to explain European disintegration, but it is not a 
necessary component of any theory.    
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II. The Uses and Limitations of Theory in the Study of the EU  
There has been hitherto no shortage of theorizing on the European Union. Each 
of the major theories has offered a substantial contribution to our understanding 
of the motors and locus of power in the process of European integration. 
Nonetheless, a number of challenges face anyone seeking to theorize the EU.  
 
The first challenge, what can be dubbed the number 1 problem, is the uniqueness 
of European integration. Neofunctionalists sought to develop theories of regional 
integration based on the post-war pooling of sovereignty (e.g. Haas, 1958), but 
most theoretical activity focused on European integration has tended to respond 
to the challenge ‘of what is this an instance?’ (Rosenau and Durfee, 1995), by 
focusing on the case in hand and just making the occasional reference to wider 
lessons and the possibility of theoretical travel.  Can – or indeed should we – 
focus just on the theoretical analysis of a single case? There is a real danger that 
a theory applied to one case becomes ‘little more than a sophisticated 
description of that one case’ (Rosamond, 2000, p. 69). Nonetheless, variations 
over time and in different policy fields offer traction from any theory of 
European integration, albeit one with more limited traction than the grand 
theories of politics or International Relations.     
 
This criticism segways into a second challenge laid down by Hix (1994, 1996) 
who not only argued that just as we have no theory of American or German 
politics there could not be a theory of the EU, but also that neofunctionalist and 
intergovernmentalist accounts largely conducted by International Relations 
scholars were asking the wrong questions. For Hix, the study of the EU required 
an embrace of the toolkit of comparative politics. I would wholeheartedly agree 
that comparative politics can bring – and indeed has brought (e.g. Jachtenfuchs, 
2001) – considerable insights into the workings of the EU system, but does that 
mean we should abandon EU integration theory altogether?   
 
Even accepting that there is merit in a theory focused on EU integration poses 
the dependent variable problem: what exactly is European integration (Haas, 
1971; Rosamond, 2000)? If there have been disagreements between scholars 
over this fundamental question (Diez and Wiener, 2009) one might ask what 
hope is there for meaningful dialogue between different theoretical traditions let 
alone developing a more cogent theory? Nonetheless, at the heart of most 
understandings of integration is the pooling of sovereignty i.e. the responsibility 
for certain decisions are taken at a supranational level. Through political, 
economic and legal analysis of the degree of delegation and the extent of pooling 
it is possible to produce measures of the variety and depth of integration across 
a large number of policy areas (e.g. Börzel, 2005).  
 
I would suggest there is still merit in integration theory, which explains the pace, 
degree and variable nature of integration, stagnation and disintegration. In their 
different ways each of the four routes discussed below highlight the merits of 
integration theory. Adaptation and combinatorial approaches provide an 
explanation for the amount and form of the pooling of sovereignty, alternative 
theories encourage us to look in different ways and places, and disintegration 
 6 
theorists indicate reasons why the integration project may unravel.  The four 
routes outlined below offer new directions for research which enhance our 
understanding although none per se is fully satisfactory and they all provoke 
deeper questions and concerns.  
 
III. Four Routes Towards a Better Understanding of the EU and European 
Integration  
 
Recent developments in the study of the European Union have provoked 
scholars to travel down four theoretical routes: alternative, adaptation, synthesis 
and explaining disintegration. In order to unlock the puzzles of European 
integration alternative approaches use different disciplines and non-mainstream 
paths, adaptation accounts amend and refine existing frameworks and synthesis 
scholarship seeks to blend and combine different approaches. I begin though 
with attempts to explain not integration, but rather disintegration.   
 
Explaining Disintegration: Why the only way isn’t necessarily up  
Now appears a particularly ‘appropriate’ time to consider both integration and 
disintegration (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 723). Indeed, by the time this 
contribution is published, one of the major Member States may – or may not – 
have voted to leave the European Union. But it was not so much the threat of 
Brexit or even the existential challenge to the EU posed by the migration/refugee 
crisis, but rather the eurozone crisis, which fuelled an explosion of literature 
seeking to examine European disintegration, (e.g. Webber, 2014; Vollard, 2014). 
 
The great merit of the burgeoning disintegration scholarship – which 
encompasses scholars of very different backgrounds and persuasions with both 
positive and normative agendas - is to remind us integration can go in both 
directions. Any theory of integration worth its salt should be able to explain the 
speed, extent, variations and direction of integration. Whilst the emphasis on 
alternative directions of travel in disintegration accounts is to be welcomed, we 
would be wise, however, not to overemphasize their novelty. Neofunctionalists, 
for instance, did consider the conditions for disintegration: not just spillover, but 
spillback (Haas, 1967; Schmitter, 1969).   
 
Alternative:  Discipline and Deviance  
Alternative, or non-mainstream, theories have been present in scholarship for 
many years (e.g. Cocks, 1980; Calfruny and Ryner, 2003; Strange and Worth, 
2012), but much like the disintegration scholarship it has been the economic 
woes afflicting the eurozone and the general malaise surrounding European 
integration in recent times which has fuelled a new wave of interest in 
alternative theories, especially - but not exclusively – from scholars from critical 
theory/Marxist traditions (Whitman and Manners, 2016).  
 
Mainstream and critical theorists, however, have often talked about each other 
with barely concealed distain or more frequently just talked past each other. 
Much of this stems from perceived irreconcilable ontologies and 
Weltanschauungen, but also from muddying or insuperable mixing (take your 
pick) of normative and positive positions. Radical left approaches offer at times 
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astute analysis of the role of capital and capitalism. The crisis in the banking 
sector, for instance, played a significant role in precipitating the eurozone crisis. 
Moreover, examining where a large slice of the bailout funds went and the 
general thrust of policies designed to tackle the eurozone’s predicament 
underline that the response to the post-2008 economic crisis ‘fundamentally 
subordinated social concerns to market imperatives’ (Macartney, 2013, p. 8). 
Indeed, it is difficult to understand the current crisis without appreciating it is 
inextricably linked to the structures of power, the replication of those structures 
in capitalist systems and the power of international capital. For non-Marxists it is 
worth remembering that whilst his predictions and broader historicism may be 
highly questionable, Trier’s most famous son’s analysis of the workings of 19th 
century capitalism was insightful. But that does not mean we have to swallow 
hook, line and sinker a Marxist approach. At the very least we need to recognize 
the leaders and finance ministers sitting around the European Council and 
eurogroup tables were not just the pawns of international capital.    
 
The need to embrace alternative insights also extends beyond disciplinary 
boundaries. Hitherto political scientists have been at the forefront of theorizing 
European integration. This dominance has offered disciplinary rigour, but also 
disciplinary constraints (Rosamond, 2007, p. 233). Given the increasing 
specialization of modern academia where it is hard enough to keep up with the 
literature in whatever specific sub-sub-sub-discipline most of us work in, it is 
perhaps no surprise that scholars grappling to explain European integration 
have not embraced the perspectives of other disciplines as much as they should. 
As Jones and Torres (2015, p. 714) noted, ‘it is a harsh reality that in a world 
indexed by Google and narrated by Twitter, the barriers to entry in any 
disciplinary conversation are large’.  
 
Scholars of the EU have been better than most political scientists in recognizing 
the need to integrate the insights of other disciplines. Not only has the study of 
law and legal institutions enriched the scholarship of integration (e.g. Alter, 
2009; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Scicluna, 2014), for example, but it is 
clearly integral to cogent explanation. The European Court of Justice may not be 
the behemoth portrayed by Eurosceptic politicians and journalists, but thanks to 
both landmark cases such as Cassis de Dijon and day-to-day rulings it has played -
and continues to play - an important role in European integration. More 
engagement with different disciplinary perspectives, especially history as I argue 
below, is needed in order for us to better understand Puchala’s elephant.     
 
Adaptation  
Recognizing the limitations of the standard theories of neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism (both the original and the liberal variants), Christopher 
Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter (2015a, 2015b) have adapted the 
long-standing tenants of the intergovernmental school and developed ‘new 
intergovernmentalism’. At the heart of their study is what they label the 
‘integration paradox’: since the passing of the Treaty on European Union, whilst 
the basic constitutional features of the EU have remained stable, EU activity has 
expanded to an unprecedented degree. Member States, they argue, ‘pursue more 
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integration but stubbornly resist further supranationalism’ (Bickerton et al., 
2015a, p. 705). 
 
Much has changed since the early 1990s. Bickerton and colleagues (2015a, p. 
705) maintain there has been a proliferation of de novo bodies such as the 
European External Action Service, the European Food Safety Agency, the EU 
Agency for Fundamental Rights and the European Banking Authority ‘that often 
enjoy considerable autonomy by way of executive or legislative power and have 
a degree of control over their own resources’. For the new intergovernmental 
thesis the key here is that these new bodies fulfil functions that were not 
delegated to the Commission and tend to contain mechanisms for Member State 
representation. More broadly, and indicative of the centrality of Member States 
to the process of European integration, the European Council, as Puetter (2014, 
p. 68) argues, has become the ‘new centre of political gravity’. 
 
Frank Schimmelfennig (2015, p. 724), however, challenged the empirical basis of 
the new intergovernmentalism thesis, maintaining that the de novo bodies 
‘display a wide variation of intergovernmental and supranational features, the 
Commission and European Parliament have gained powers since the early 1990s 
and in the post-Maastricht era the “Ordinary Legislative Procedure” (i.e. the most 
advanced form of the Community method) is indeed, the “ordinary” decision-
making logic and procedure’ (p. 725). Moreover, other studies have questioned 
whether the Commission has been so peripheral in recent times (Nugent and 
Rhinard, 2016).3 
 
Highlighting the argument I make about presentism below, the most telling 
criticism of new intergovernmentalism, however, lies in the temporal division. 
Although we can make a distinction between a pre-Maastricht era which was 
mostly about markets and a post-Maastricht era where non-market policies 
became more prominent in European integration, to see Maastricht as a 
watershed ‘overlooks the extent to which it codified and built on existing 
integration dynamics within and around the then European Communities’ 
(Phinnemore, 2015, p. 72). Indeed, Schimmelfennig (2015, p. 726) points out 
that European Political Cooperation (1970), the Monetary Committee (1958), the 
snake (1972), the European Monetary System (1979), the TREVI anti-terrorist 
intergovernmental network (1975), the beginnings of regional policy (1975) and 
the Schengen Agreement (1985) were ‘all dominated by intensifying 
intergovernmental policy co-ordination both within and outside the Treaty 
framework’.  
 
Whilst we may challenge the ‘new’ and question new intergovernmentalism’s 
‘blanket characterization of EU integration’ (Bulmer, 2015, p. 294) Bickerton et 
al make a strong and persuasive case for an intergovernmentalist framework. 
They enrich intergovernmental accounts in two ways. Firstly, although Andrew 
Moravcsik’s (1998) Liberal Intergovernmentalism offered a detailed discussion 
of national preference formation largely in terms of the economic preferences 
Member States brought to the treaty negotiation tables, the crisis period in 
                                                        
3 See also Dinan’s contribution to this volume.  
 9 
particular has highlighted the ‘unstable set of relationships between domestic 
constituencies, member state governments, and EU policies and institutions’ 
(Bickerton, et al, 2015b p. 22). These relationships need to be understood much 
better, in particular the vulnerabilities, which shape states’ decisions to pool 
sovereignty (Keohane, 1982; Haughton 2010). With some notable exceptions 
(e.g. Paterson, 2011; Lucarelli, 2015), studies of individual Member States have 
remained largely the preserve of textbooks (e.g. Bulmer and Lequesne, 2013). 
Yet without detailed, empirically grounded studies of Member States theorizing 
on the European Union has weak foundations.  
 
The second insight concerns public opinion. In their post-functional theory of 
European integration, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009, p. 5) observed 
since the early 1990s a shift in public opinion from ‘permissive consensus’ to  
‘constraining dissensus’. Bickerton et al challenge the post-functionalist 
expectation that a more politicized public would ‘shrink[…] the scope of 
agreement’ (Bickerton et al., 2015b, p. 26). Indeed, the raft of measures agreed 
upon by the Member States in recent years to combat the Eurozone crisis (EFSF, 
ESM, Six-Pack, Two-Pack, Fiscal Compact etc.) suggests any ‘constraint’ exerted 
by public opinion has been limited.4 Moreover, Bickerton et al argue the gap 
between governments and peoples has created an unprecedented opportunity 
for expanding the activities of the EU, but has also been a powerful constraint on 
the manner in which integration has taken place.  
 
Public opinion, however, does matter. At times decision-making has been 
characterized by insulation and separation, but popular will has played a role. 
Indeed, it is difficult to understand the stances taken by Angela Merkel and David 
Cameron around the European Council table without considering the role played 
by public opinion. In Germany, the ‘politics of timing and the timing of politics’ 
has mattered to Merkel (Jacoby, 2015) and in the past few years it has felt that 
the Farage-fuelled Eurosceptic public opinion in the UK has been the tail wagging 
the dog in British policy and practice in Brussels. We should not underestimate 
the political antennae of those sitting round the key decision-making bodies in 
the EU representing Member States. Critics might point to the disregard of Greek 
public opinion expressed during two elections and a referendum during the 
course of 20155, but whilst some individuals may have been driven by plans and 
ideology, we would be unwise to ignore domestic political opinion in other 
Member States. Public opinion does matter for politicians as it will ultimately 
determine how long they stay in their seats. As Jean-Claude Juncker once 
famously remarked, ‘We all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-
elected afterwards’.6 
 
The eurozone crisis, the possibility of Brexit and perhaps most especially the 
migration/refugee crisis have ensured a high level of politicization of the EU 
(Risse, 2015). Any satisfactory theory of European integration needs to integrate 
public opinion and political linkage into the equation in a robust and systematic 
                                                        
4 See Hodson’s contributions to this and previous issues of the Annual Review 
5 See Featherstone’s contribution to this volume 
6 The Economist, 15 March 2007 
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manner highlighting when they do and do not matter. As Hanspeter Kriesi argues 
in this volume politicization is not simply a post-Maastricht phenomenon. 
Indeed, rather than Maastricht marking a watershed it may be better to refer to 
‘intermittent politicization’. Moreover, politicization has not only varied over 
time, but is highly differentiated across countries. This argument underlines the 
need for more bottom-up empirically grounded studies rather than examinations 
of top-down Europeanization.  
 
Combinatorial  
Whereas Bickerton et al. have sought to identify and elaborate a new general 
theory of integration, when confronted with the challenge of explaining the post-
2008 crisis period of the EU or the development of integration in non socio-
economic areas over a longer period of time, other scholars have sought instead 
to build new theoretical models and insights in a combinatorial, eclectic or 
synthetic manner (e.g. Jones et al, 2016; Leuffen et al. 2013), drawing explicitly 
or implicitly on calls for combination and to transcend the theoretical divides 
over ‘isms’  (e.g. Jupille et al, 2003; Lake, 2011; Saurugger, 2014; Verdun, 2002).    
 
Jones et al (2016), for instance, combine intergovernmentalism with 
neofunctionalism in their explanation for the incremental, step-by-step response 
of the EU to the daunting economic and financial challenges of the eurozone 
crisis. Intergovernmental bargaining, they argue, leads to incompleteness 
because it forces states with diverse preferences to settle on lowest common 
denominator solutions. Incompleteness then unleashes forces that lead to crisis 
and Member States respond yet again by agreeing to lowest common 
denominator solutions. In their schema, the EU ‘fails forward’: ‘again and again 
responding to the failures of incremental reforms by taking new steps to expand 
the scope and intensity of integration’ (Jones et al, 2016, p. 1012). But such an 
intergovernmental account by itself could indicate two different directions of 
travel. What pushes the states towards solutions involving more integration are 
the ‘forces of neofunctional spillover and supranational activism’ (Jones et al, 
2016, p. 1015).   
 
A different way of conceiving European integration using a combinatorial 
approach has been offered by Dirk Leuffen, Berthhold Rittberger and Frank 
Schmimmelfennig (2013).  They set out to explain variation in the integration 
process, both in horizontal (i.e. the ‘territorial extension of the EU’s policy 
regimes’) and vertical (i.e. capturing the ‘depth or centralization of supranational 
decision-making in different policy areas’) terms (Leuffen, 2013, p. 245). 
 
Identifying differentiation per se is nothing new (e.g. Stubb, 1996; Kölliker, 
2006), but ‘differentiation has increased rather than diminished in the course of 
European integration’ (Leuffen, 2013, p. 26) and is worthy of explanation. 
Although Leuffen et al agree on the importance of intergovernmentalism, in 
contrast to Jones et al’s, (2016, p. 1015) emphasis on neofunctionalism’s ability 
to explain the ‘gradual patterns of change over time’, they suggest an 
intergovernmental baseline model which is affected by both institutional path-
dependencies at the supranational level stressed by historical institutionalists 
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(Pierson, 2006) and identity politics at the domestic level (Hooghe and Marks 
2009).  
 
To be convincing as an overall theoretical framework for explaining integration 
any combinatorial approach cannot just be a pick and mix theory, which suggests 
X matters here, but Y matters there. It has to confront the challenge of whether 
the components can be combined in a meaningful and coherent manner. 
Ontological and epistemological purists might suggest different positions are 
‘unalloyable’, but combination is ‘possible’ (Jupille, 2006, p. 213). Indeed, in a 
prize-winning book Frank Schimmelfennig (2003), for instance, blended 
constructivist and realist ideas effectively into the most cogent explanation of the 
eastern enlargement of the EU.  
 
Even if we navigate the ontological and epistemological hurdle, however, there 
are further challenges. For some, theoretical approaches such as neo-
functionalism are a ‘package deal’ (Alter, 2009, p. 14). But on closer inspection 
some of the major theoretical traditions are not a million miles apart. If we 
examine the major (supranational and liberal intergovernmental) accounts of 
what drove the internal market programme of the late 1980s, putting aside 
‘[d]ifferences in emphasis’, ‘the ingredients of both explanations are very similar’ 
(Schimmelfennig, 2010, p. 40). Moreover, several conditions of integration 
(interdependence, convergence of preferences and politicization) ‘are stipulated 
explicitly or accepted implicitly by intergovernmentalism, supranationalism and 
constructivism’ (Leuffen et al., 2013, p260). In other words, the challenge is not 
so much whether combination is possible, but how to construct a cogent 
combinatorial framework. Integral to that task are questions related to empirical 
foundations and the manner in which we undertake research.   
 
 
IV. Extending and Enhancing the Road To a Better Understanding  
The four routes sketched out above provide promising avenues of 
understanding, but I suggest theoretical work on EU integration needs to go 
further in three ways.  
 
The Parts, The Sum and The Whole  
Although it contains only a passing reference, Leuffen et al’s Differentiated 
Integration, can be seen as illustrative of what Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein 
(2010) have labelled ‘Analytical Eclecticism’. Taking inspiration from 
Hirschman’s (1970) argument that paradigms can be a ‘hindrance to 
understanding’ and drawing on a number of examples of scholarships that have 
combined different approaches, Sil and Katzenstein make a strong and 
persuasive case for a combinatorial approach. They argue that ‘[s]implifications 
based on a single theoretical lens involve trade-offs, and can produce enduring 
blind spots unless accompanied by complementary, countervailing efforts to 
“recomplexify” problems’ (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010, p. 9). The word ‘eclecticism’ 
may be synonymous with ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘ragtag’ (Bennett, 2013, p. 461), 
but Sil and Katzenstein’s purpose is to emphasize taking the best from a variety 
of different approaches, methods or styles. They see analytical eclecticism’s 
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value-added as ‘a more open-ended analysis that can incorporate the insights of 
different paradigm-bound theories’ (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010, p. 20).     
 
Sil and Katzenstein are not suggesting that combinatorial approaches are 
necessarily suitable in all cases. Narrow questions can be – and perhaps are best 
- addressed within single paradigms, but for what they see as ‘open-ended’ and 
real world problems of international politics, Sil and Katzenstein argue there is a 
need to examine them in all their complexity and breadth. So far, beyond studies 
in European security and foreign policy (Cladi and Locatelli, 2016; Pohl and van 
Willigen, 2015) there has been little explicit use of analytical eclectic approaches 
in studies of the EU, but the evolving EU elephant seems a highly appropriate 
specimen to examine using analytical eclecticism. Indeed, it is striking not just 
that Jabko (2006) and Schimmelfennig’s (2003) work are referenced as 
examples of the kind of approach Sil and Katzenstein advocate, but also that 
Analytical Eclecticism is dedicated to three scholars who made major 
contributions to the study of European integration: Ernest Haas, Karl Deutsch 
and Stanley Hoffmann.  
 
Changing Realities, Changing Theories: The Problem of Presentism   
For obvious reasons political science tends to have a bias towards the present.  
New theoretical frameworks have tended to emerge out of a feeling the existing 
ones do not explain the present (e.g. Hoffmann, 1966; Hooghe and Marks, 2009; 
Egan et al, 2010) and the multiple crises besetting the EU have understandably 
prompted scholars to search for new explanations. Crisis periods often feel new 
and distinct. If they really are so new and distinct, requiring new theorizing then 
we open ourselves up to the accusation that rather than just limiting ourselves to 
n=1 we restrict ourselves to n=only a fraction of 1. Any truly convincing theory 
of European integration would be able to explain, for example, the lack of any 
integration after World War One, the decision to pool sovereignty after World 
War Two, the subsequent speed, nature and variety of integration and ultimately 
any disintegration. The ability of the work of Haas (1958), Hoffmann (1966) and 
Moravcsik (1998) to address at least most of these questions is part of the 
reason for their enduring appeal. Of course one strand of theorizing on the EU, 
historical institutionalism, has stressed the role of historical decisions in shaping 
the course of European integration, particularly in terms of identifying the 
stickiness of institutions and ‘critical junctures’ (e.g. Pierson, 1996; Verdun, 
2015) and it is no surprise that combinatorial approaches have embraced 
historical institutionalism (e.g. Leuffen, 2013).  
 
Indeed, in seeking to understand the current crisis we would be wise to think in 
more historical terms. Braudel highlighted the focus on the present of ‘l’histoire 
evenmentielle’ flaring up in the night like a ‘firework display of phosphorescent 
fireflies’ and briefly illuminating the landscape around it might catch our eyes, 
but it can detract attention away from understanding ‘the slower trajectories of 
change and the enduring continuities’ (Braudel, 1980, pp. 10, 26; Tosh, 2008, p. 
43). 
 
Moreover, a deeper understanding of historical developments can help explain 
the crises and the responses of Member States. The Central and East European 
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states response to the flow of refugees is intimately linked to historical issues of 
weaker statehood and comparatively limited experience of migration during 
communist times (Haughton, 2016), the Brexit referendum of 2016 has striking 
parallels with the previous referendum of 1975 and Germany’s stance and 
actions in the eurozone crisis cannot be understood without reference to the 
experience of unification a quarter of a century previously (Newman, 2015).7  
 
This is not to suggest the present and the current crises are somehow carbon 
copies of past developments, but rather to stress the need to be more cognizant 
of longer-term historical developments. Jones et al’s (2016) theorizing which 
offers a distinction between short-term intergovernmentalist dynamics and a 
much longer-term neofunctional logic, for instance, offers a helpful way of 
incorporating historical insights.  
 
Who, Where, What, When…….. and Why?  
Scholars who have taken us down the alternative, adaptation, combination and 
disintegration routes have shed light on actors and processes and have provoked 
thinking about the speed, nature, motors, brakes and direction of European 
integration. Nevertheless, there is a more fundamental question to pose about 
advancement in knowledge: does theory help or hinder the search for 
understanding? Theories – as all adherents of them stress – offer fast-tracks and 
short-cuts, allowing us to speed along bypassing seemingly unimportant detail 
and getting us quickly to explanations. Yet do we know enough in order to 
theorize? The precursor of a satisfactory answer to a “why?” question are 
answers to the questions of who, where, what and when? Even Waltz (1990, p. 
23), who offers a trenchant defence of theory, argues that we cannot ask how 
does X work or does it all hang together unless one has some clear idea of what 
the “thing” or the “it” might be.     
  
The pace of change in the eurozone and the EU over the past few years has been 
striking. A plethora of measures, agreements and actions have ensured the single 
currency has survived and possibly with it the entire EU. The crisis, though, is 
not over. Until the eurozone crisis is behind us there are difficulties in thinking 
about causes and consequences, let alone the contribution of those events to the 
wider theoretical agenda. Indeed, it is striking that not only have many of the 
best accounts to explain the state of the EU largely eschewed theory (Copsey, 
2015; Schmidt, 2009; Tsoukalis, 2011)8, but probably the two most insightful 
accounts of the eurozone crisis published so far have either sidestepped the 
theories of European integration (Marsh, 2010) or refrained from discussing the 
grand theories of integration until the penultimate chapter (Matthijs and Blyth, 
2015). I am not suggesting that we should avoid all theorizing, but rather be 
more cautious of theorizing an on-going process.  
 
Moreover, the rush to theory is having a potentially deleterious impact on our 
scholarship. Inspired in part by developments in US legal scholarship the main 
                                                        
7 It is worth remembering that Wolfgang Schäuble was a major player in the 
negotiations for German unification and the eurozone crisis (Novotná, 2015). 
8 See also Börzel’s contribution to this volume.  
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direction of travel in legal studies of the EU over the past few decades has been 
away from doctrinal research involving article by article commentary and 
annotation and a close reading of texts towards more contextual and political 
analysis (Arnull, 2008, 2010). Whilst the greater interdisciplinarity of that shift 
was very much to be welcomed, the contextual work is only possible ‘because 
other writers have conducted the necessary doctrinal analysis’ (Arnull, 2008, p. 
426). If too many scholars abandon analysis based on a close reading of the texts, 
there is a danger that contextual work will be based on insecure foundations. We 
can draw a parallel here with trends in the study of comparative politics. Robust 
and convincing large ‘n’ studies are frequently built on the insights of country 
experts. Without those who know the detail about specific cases, there is the 
danger of number-crunchers confusing what is ‘measurable’ with what is 
‘meaningful’ (Copsey, 2015, p. 209). Indeed, it is striking that some of the most 
significant theoretical contributions to political science have grown out of 
detailed empirical scholarship of a single case (e.g. Putnam, 1993).    
 
These two arguments underline the need for scholars not just to have greater 
knowledge of the twists and turns of more recent events, but also to have a solid 
historical grounding of developments. Yet despite the obvious linkages between 
history and political science, it is striking how little dialogue there is between the 
two disciplines. History is not just about descriptive detail, but can provide much 
of the flesh for political scientists helping to turn their arguments from 
lightweight to heavyweight.    
  
Nevertheless, we need to ask a more fundamental question about how we use 
theory. To claims that theory might distract, or worse distort, scholarship 
provokes numerous objections. If we simply seek an empirical route might we 
just end up with a mindless collection of data? The European Union is not the 
most scintillating object of study at the best of times, but if we all become bean 
counters then we may end up trading interesting ideas for dull as ditchwater 
detail. Moreover, Rosamond (2006, p. 450) rightly reminds us, ‘the selection of 
particular events or phenomena in the EU’s history is in and of itself a theoretical 
choice’. Perhaps the greater risk, however, lies in theoretical cherry picking i.e. 
choosing assumptions that will generate the kinds of results the investigator 
wants to find (Pfleiderer, 2014). Instead of offering us a beeline to an 
explanation, theory may send us down a blind alley.  
 
My purpose here is not to suggest that theory has no role (it does), but rather to 
argue we should be careful not to fetishize theory. Moreover, a specific theory 
should not be the starting point, guiding light and the end point of research 
activity. Instead of starting with a theory, generating a research question and 
undertaking empirical research to test theoretical expectations, we would be 
better off with deeper empirical studies unencumbered by specific theories as 
we generate and clarify the puzzles and only at a later stage testing and refining 
theories.  Such studies would move at a slower pace, along empirical side roads 
rather than theoretical super-highways. They may not yield much ultimate 
insight - but then neither do unsatisfactory theories - but they will generate raw 
material which can be used for wider reflections. It is striking that Marks and 
Hooghe (2009) acknowledged that one of the major stimuli for their post-
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functional theory of European integration was the mass of data generated by the 
Chapel Hill expert surveys which simply aimed at mapping party politics in the 
Member States. Moreover, Kassim et al’s (2013) extensive survey of Commission 
officials’ background and beliefs provides the basis for more robust theorizing. 
Neither Marks and Hooghe nor Kassim and colleagues embarked on their data 
collection viewing European integration through a specific theoretical lens, but 
as Donald Trump might put it, ‘to figure out what the hell is going on’.     
 
Stanley Hoffmann (1959, p. 358) warned us nearly six decades ago that 
‘[c]ollecting facts is not enough; it is not helpful to gather answers when no 
questions have been asked first’. Few would disagree, but how do we generate 
those questions? Put simply, we can be driven by paradigms or puzzles. Whilst 
there is merit in paradigm-driven research agendas if we want to test specific 
theories, grappling with the open-ended questions of European integration are 
far better suited to puzzle-driven research.  Not only can starting from empirical 
questions be a more engaging way to teach (Edkins and Zehfuss, 2014), but it 
will ultimately take us to better destinations.  
 
Conclusion: The Long and Winding Road  
We should welcome the recent contributions of scholars who have forwarded 
alternative, adaptation, synthesis and disintegration frameworks for 
understanding European integration. Disintegration scholars remind us the 
direct of travel is not always forwards, whereas synthesis scholars underline that 
combining different approaches is not only possible, but necessary to grasp the 
‘the multifaceted and hybrid nature of European integration’ (Egan et al, 2010, p. 
2). As Hoffmann (1959, p. 372) warned many years ago, ‘[e]xcessive emphasis on 
one perspective produces optical illusions’. Adaptation scholars question 
whether the same frameworks can be used in different time periods and the 
alternative theories highlight that at the heart of an integration process which 
has markets and states requires an understanding of the functioning of 
capitalism and more broadly they remind us that a single disciplinary toolkit is 
not enough.  
 
Genuine interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches are much harder to 
construct and coordinate, but given the collective acquired wisdom they can 
contain they have a much better chance of grasping the elephant in its entirety. 
In particular, any attempt to explain integration needs to be built on a solid 
historical basis. Arguably the most telling critiques of the theories of integration 
have come from historians (e.g. Milward, 1992; Lieshout, 2004). Moreover, our 
response to theories not seeking to explain the present is often to generate new 
theories, but these should also provoke us to look again more carefully at the 
empirical bases in previous periods. Present periods may be exceptions rather 
than the rule.   
 
The JCMS Annual Review of 2015 is an appropriate place to reflect on the role of 
theory in the study of the European Union not just due to the significant 
scholarly activity of recent times, but also given Stanley Hoffmann’s sad death in 
September 2015 and his lifetime contribution to the study of European politics 
and society.  This is not to suggest Hoffmann was a ground-breaking theorist. 
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Indeed, his elegantly written articles highlighted the role and motivations of 
obstinate states, adding a necessary note of caution to our use of theories rather 
than outline a systematic theory of intergovernmentalism.  
 
Theories are neither panaceas nor silver bullets. At best they can offer us a 
speedy and direct route to understanding, but we need to be cautious. ‘[W]e have 
to proceed methodically and gradually’, conscious that ‘the weakness of many 
theories comes from their attempt to skip several stages’ (Hoffmann, 1959, p. 
370). Robust theorizing needs not only to take adequate cognizance of the 
existing corpus, avoiding the dumping of existing theoriesw just because they do 
not explain the present predicament, but also it needs to be grounded in 
thorough and detailed empirical knowledge. If well constructed they will help us 
pose better questions, uncover new and potentially promising paths of 
discovery, and ensure the long and winding road to understanding is at least a 
little shorter.  
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